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JOINT VENTURES BETWEEN UNITED STATES FIRMS
AND SOVIET ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS*
HARoLD J. BERMAN * *
At present there are no commercial joint ventures, in the
strict sense, in existence between United States firms and Soviet
economic organizations;' that is, there are (with one special
exception) 2 no enterprises in which the two sides contribute
capital, share profits and losses, and carry on joint management.
There are about a dozen such joint ventures between Soviet
economic organizations and private companies in various Western
European countries, but these are chiefly organizations for market-
ing Soviet exports - automobiles, oil, lumber products, and the
like.4 In any case, although it is fascinating, and even somewhat
ironic, to see Soviet state economic organizations participating
in capitalist enterprises outside the Soviet Union,5 that is a wholly
* Report delivered at a colloquium of the Russian Research Center, Harvard
University, October 31, 1974. The Report also served as a report to the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Trade and Economic Council, in whose behalf the author conducted interviews on
legal aspects of joint ventures in Moscow in May-June, 1974. Footnotes have been
added by the editors, except where otherwise indicated.
** James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
1. An analysis of the Soviet system of foreign trade, including a short discussion
of East-West joint ventures, is given in H. J. Berman and G. L. Bustin, The Soviet
System of Foreign Trade, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH THE USSR 25, 69-70
(R. Starred. 1975) [hereinafter Bus. TRANSACTIONS WITH THE USSR].
2. The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, a trade promotion council,
is itself a kind of joint venture; Soviet and American members participate on an
equal basis, and there is joint management by Soviet and American executive officers
both in New York and Moscow. [Author's footnote.]
3. There are various levels of economic cooperation between western businesses
and Soviet trading organizations which fall short of a full joint venture. See infra
note 9. For a discussion of the various forms of East-West economic cooperation
and their limitations, see Berman & Bustin, supra note 1 at 67-69; see also, Pederson,
Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union: A Legal and Economic Perspective, 16 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 390 (1975). The Pederson article relies on the present paper, in its then
unpublished form, for some of its information as well as some of its principal themes.
4. Kiralfy, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, EAST-WEST BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 338 (R. Starr ed. 1974) [hereinafter EAST-WEST Bus. TRANSACTIONS].
5. For a discussion of Soviet concern about the implications of increased East-
West economic involvement for Soviet ideology, see Fitzpatrick, Soviet-A merica*
Trade, 1972-1974: A Summary, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 39, 69 (1974).
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different matter from the participation of capitalist enterprises
jointly with Soviet state economic organizations in the production
and marketing of goods within the Soviet Union. Such a joint
venture seems, at first, quite unlikely if not impossible; yet it is
being seriously discussed by responsible American businessmen
and high Soviet officials.6
Even if a true U.S.-Soviet joint venture never materializes,
careful consideration of the problems and possibilities of such an
enterprise will, I believe, at least shed light on the limitations of
present forms of economic exchange between the United States
and the Soviet Union. If such joint ventures do materialize, they
may help to engender significant long-range changes within the
Soviet economic system, as well as have important long-range
effects on Soviet foreign policy. These must, however, be only
latent consequences, and not manifest purposes of such joint
ventures; otherwise, they will not be tolerated by the Soviet
authorities.
It is not just eager American businessmen but also sober
Western statesmen who are talking about "investment" - and
not just "trade" - in the Soviet Union. Secretary of State
Kissinger, in his Special Report on U.S.-Soviet Relations pre-
sented to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September
19, 1974 stated: "Over time, trade and investment may leaven the
autarkic tendencies of the Soviet system, invite gradual associa-
tion of the Soviet economy with the world economy, and foster
a degree of interdependence that adds an element of stability to
the political equation" (italics added) .7 The interesting word is
"investment" - something that would hardly have been thought
of before the early 1970s. Investment presumably (though not
necessarily) means joint ventures in the sense already indicated,
since it is hardly possible that the Soviet Government would
allow foreign resources to be contributed in the Soviet Union
without Soviet participation in their management.8
6. Cf. East-West Investment Proceedings of the American Bar Association
National Institute, Washington, D.C. 1975, 10 INT'L LAWYER 35-64 (1976).
7. The full text of Secretary Kissinger's remarks may be found in Hearings
on United States Relations with Community Countries Before the Senate Comm. on
* Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 238 passim (1974).
8. Soviet writers do not (at least thus far) accept the word "investment" (in
Russian, investitsiia, kapitalovlozhenie) in this context, since they consider that it
connotes "surplus value" and "exploitation." Yet the Russian word vklad, meaning
"contribution," "deposit," "input" (and also "investment") is acceptable, and Ameri-
cans may have to adjust to this fine distinction. [Author's footnote.]
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Soviet willingness to explore the question of joint ventures
was suggested in a major speech by Secretary General Brezhnev
at Kiev in June 1973. The speech was reported at great length
in Pravda, Izvestia, and elsewhere, but the part concerning eco-
nomic cooperation with capitalist countries was only summarized;
it was merely stated that "Comrade Brezhnev spoke about the
importance of the development of large-scale and long-term eco-
nomic cooperation between the Soviet Union on the one hand
and the socialist countries and capitalist states on the other ...."
Presumably, Brezhnev said a great deal more on the subject,
since Soviet visitors to this country thereafter - for example,
Dzherman Gvishiani, Deputy President of the State Committee
on Science and Technology, and Georgii Arbatov, Director of
the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies - indicated in con-
versations that Brezhnev's Kiev speech gave the green light to
serious discussions concerning more intimate, more diffuse, and
more enduring economic relationships between Soviet state eco-
nomic organizations and individual firms of market economies.
In the fall of 1973 the Institute of World Economy and Inter-
national Relations, in Moscow, in a report made at the request
of Gosplan, called for manufacturing and research projects in-
volving continuous and close cooperation with Western firms.
Also, Gvishiani, speaking in San Francisco in September 1973
to a group of business leaders from 75 countries, stated that the
most important feature of the contemporary stage in the de-
velopment of economic relations between the Soviet Union and
the advanced Western countries is a transition from "sporadic
commercial deals to a planned and programmed economic
cooperation on a stable and long-term basis."
More concretely, Gvishiani also said that he could visualize
cooperative arrangements whereby 30 to 40 percent of the output
of a Soviet plant could be put at the disposal of a Western firm
for a long-term period, during which time the Western partner
could, through contractual arrangements, control the quality of
such output destined for it and could effectively participate in
management on an advisory or consultative basis or as an employee
of the Soviet partner. This may not, by its terms, fulfill the
American concept of a joint venture; on the other hand, "quality
control" and "management contract" are very expandable
concepts.9
9. With respect to the degree of interdependence of the parties, the present
typical form of close cooperation between the Soviet Union and a Western firm,
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In Moscow in June 1974 I was told by Deputy Director
Shershnev of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies that
nearly twenty scholars in that Institute are now studying Ameri-
can economic and legal literature dealing with joint ventures in
order to determine whether to recommend that the Soviet Govern-
ment give serious consideration to encouraging arrangements with
similar effect. Shershnev said he had no objection to the term
"joint venture," although, he added, it may have different mean-
ings to different people. "Joint undertaking" or "joint enterprise"
(sovmestnoe predpriiatie, or possibly sovmestnoe predprinimatel'
stvo) would be preferable terms from the Soviet viewpoint.
It may be that the failure to report at length Brezhnev's
remarks of June 1973 on economic cooperation with capitalist
countries was due to a conflict over the extent to which such
cooperation should go. For example, some Soviet officials have
dismissed American talk about joint ventures in the Soviet Union
as illusory and have said that they would be impossible under
the Soviet economic system. Others have said that Soviet state-
ments disparaging such close forms of economic cooperation were
"correct when made but incorrect for the future."
From the standpoint of American business there are two
chief disadvantages in restricting our economic relations with the
Soviet Union to exports and imports. The first is that for certain
types of economic enterprise, profits from exporting are not as
great as the potential returns from direct investment. The second
is that U.S. exports to the Soviet Union are limited by the
capacity of the Soviets to pay in hard currency earned by their
exports to the U.S. and to other advanced industrial countries,
and those Soviet exports are limited, in turn, by the Soviet
capacity to produce the goods needed in the U.S. and other
the so-called industrial cooperation agreement (ICA), falls between the full joint
venture on the one hand and the typical export-import contract on the other.
Soviet export-import contracts are generally specific, short-term agreements for the
purchase and sale of goods. ICAs appear in a variety of forms, including, for
example, licensing and subcontracting contracts. See text at note 17 infra. Generally,
an ICA involves an exchange of capital and technology from the West for goods and
services from the socialist partner; ICAs do not, however, provide for Western input
to the Soviet management process. In the joint venture, Western management skills
are included in the package of Western contributions. An excellent analysis of the
"levels" of economic involvement between Western firms and East European countries
is found in C. McMILLAN AND D. P. ST. CHARLES, JOINT VENTURES IN EASTERN
EUROPE: A THREE-COUNTRY COMPARISON 12 (1973); cf. Berman and Bustin, supra
note 1, at 25 ff., especially 64-72.
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advanced countries. Soviet export capacity might be greatly
enhanced, however, by increased efficiency derived from American
participation in Soviet management and marketing. The Soviets
could export, to others or to us, the products of our joint ventures
and thereby earn the hard currency needed to increase their
imports from us.
The Soviet interest in joint ventures is parallel to the Ameri-
can interest. 0 The Soviets want to acquire American managerial
and marketing skills and to increase their capacity to produce
goods for export to advanced industrial countries. In addition,
the overriding Soviet desire to acquire advanced technology is
much more likely to be satisfied by long-term joint management
of pooled resources - the essence of a joint venture - than by
the importation of technology, however extensive the supervision
on the part of the foreign licensor.
To give a typical example, an American company negotiates
a contract with a Soviet foreign trade organization to license
certain sophisticated technology in the field of electronics. The
Soviet party to the contract wants a guarantee that if the designs
and instructions of the American exporter are followed by the
Soviet producer, the resulting equipment will work. The American
party is hesitant. It knows that if its scientists and technicians
follow the designs and instructions, the equipment will work, but
it cannot be sure that Soviet scientists and technicians - however
well trained and however skilled - will get the same results. It
therefore insists that the guarantee be limited to situations in
which the equipment is produced by Soviet personnel with the
same experience, and not only with the same training and skills,
as its own personnel.
This example suggests that Soviet production capabilities
would be enhanced if the American producer sent not only its
equipment but also its scientists and technicians - and man-
agers - to the Soviet Union for an extended period of time to
help the Soviets acquire the experience necessary to guarantee
the efficiency of the technology. It suggests, further, that the
importer of technology will always be behind the foreign producer
of that technology: by the time the importer has mastered the
technology, the producer has gone beyond it. The Soviets under-
10. For a discussion of the factors motivating Eastern European countries to
enter into joint ventures with Western businesses, including a discussion of related
contract negotiation issues, see R. KRETSCHMAR AND R. FooR, THE POTENTIAL FOR
JOINT VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE 15-17 (1972).
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stand fully that in many situations it is better to import tech-
nology than goods, since with the foreign technology one may be
able to produce the goods more cheaply at home; but they are
only beginning to understand that in many situations it is also
better to import both the equipment and the personnel in order
to produce at home the technology as well, and also in order to
give the foreign partner an interest in the continued updating
of the technology."
That the Soviet Union is coming to this understanding is
clear from the development of Western participation in Soviet
production. Although joint ventures have not, thus far, been
accepted by Soviet organizations as a form of international eco-
nomic enterprise within the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government
has nevertheless, in the past decade, moved well beyond the
classical export-import transaction, including the export-import
of technology (through sale of licenses)12 and the sale of entire
production units (with or without additional technical assistance
to put them in operation). To an ever-increasing extent, Soviet
organizations, under industrial cooperation agreements, have im-
ported capital equipment and advanced technology on a long-
term basis, in return exporting finished goods and raw materials
which are themselves the product of the cooperative enterprise.
These arrangements, although they constitute "trade" rather than
"investment," differ from the classical import-export transaction
in that they involve (a) continuing transfers over a relatively
long time, (b) a higher degree of interdependence and coopera-
tion, and (c) more complex organizational ties. They also differ,
however, from joint ventures in the strict sense, since they do
not involve long-term joint management of pooled resources, with
sharing of profits or losses.
The immediate Soviet interest in industrial cooperation
agreements is to acquire high-quality equipment and technology;
to pay for these not in hard currency but in exports; and to take
advantage of Western marketing skills and outlets for Soviet
products. The immediate interest of Western business firms is
to receive finished goods or raw materials at a price well below
the cost of home production, owing partly to the low cost of
11. The involvement of a Western partner also insures the utilization of Western
marketing outlets, although this may be achieved without a joint venture. Cf.
MCMILLAN & ST. CHARLES, supra note 9, at 18.
12. Cf. Starr & Casella, Technology Transfers, Licensing and Cooperation Agree-
tnents with the USSR, Bus. TRANsACToNs WITH THE USSR 125, 126-35.
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Soviet labor and primary materials and partly to the low cost of
transferring existing values to a new market.
Industrial cooperation agreements may be quite complex.
For example, a few years ago Parsons Whittemore, a French
subsidiary of a United States firm, agreed with the Soviet foreign
trade organization Prommashimport to build a $160 million pulp
and paper complex at Ust-Ulim in Siberia, for which 35 French
firms were to supply equipment for various processes. Prommash-
import, acting as a commission agent for various Soviet economic
organizations, was to pay for the initial imports of equipment and
technology over a period of approximately eight years by exporting
a portion of the expected annual output of 500,000 tons of cellu-
lose. In addition, Parsons Whittemore was to purchase 85,000
tons annually for sale in France and other Western European
countries.13
Another agreement that has attracted wide publicity is the
undertaking in 1973 by Armand Hammer's Occidental Petroleum,
together with Chemico, to build a chemical fertilizer complex in
the Soviet Union, with commitments to purchase four million
tons of ammonia, urea, and potash over a 20-year period, while
the Soviets will purchase from Occidental Petroleum one million
tons of superphosphoric acid.'"
Many other similar arrangements could be mentioned, such
as the recent agreement of a West German steel consortium to
build an iron and steel plant near Kursk at a total cost of $2.2
billion, and the purchase over a 10-year period some millions of
tons of iron-ore pellets and steel products (subsequently, the
Soviet side agreed to pay cash instead). Also impressive are
various Soviet-Japanese deals to develop timber resources in the
Soviet Far East and Siberia, with Japan agreeing to provide
hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of timber-production
equipment in return for timber.15
It seems obvious that if the Western exporter of the plant
and equipment and technology is to be reimbursed by the de-
livery of a portion of the output, he will have a very strong
interest in the way in which the plant and equipment and
technology are installed and used to produce that output. Yet
thus far the Soviets have been very reluctant to accept any
13. McMITU.AN & ST. CHARLES, supra note 9, at 13.
14. Fitzpatrick, supra note 5, at 49.
15. Kiralfy, su pra note 4.
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foreign cooperation - including, incidentally, not only Western,
but also Eastern European cooperation - in the management of
Soviet enterprise. They are reluctant to permit foreign on-site
project surveys and they will rarely disclose production figures.
When they purchase licenses for the use of Western patents and
know-how, they usually (although not always) refuse to pay
royalties in the ordinary sense, which would require disclosure
of the number of units produced, and they never agree to pay a
percentage of profits; instead they prefer to pay a lump sum in
advance, even though it costs them more. The concern for secrecy
is diminishing, however, and conceivably it could be overcome
in particular instances.
There are other obstacles to joint ventures which seem even
more substantial. Some are more legal than economic: How can
a foreigner's investment be secured when he cannot, under Soviet
law, own the means of production - how can he have an "equity,"
as we say, in Soviet plant and equipment, or in the plant and
equipment which he himself provides, once it is transferred to
Soviet soil? Second, how can a foreigner share in management of
a Soviet state enterprise? How can he exercise his shared mana-
gerial rights in a system that gives absolute power of economic
planning and administration to central authorities (Gosplan,
industrial ministries, Gossnab, Gosbank, the Ministry of Foreign
Trade, etc.) ? After all, the Soviet planned economy is not merely
a general framework within which economic enterprises operate;
it is also a hierarchical system of administrative authorities in
which the enterprise is the lowest unit.16
There are other problems that are more economic than legal,
although they have an important legal dimension: How are profits
to be measured? How are prices to be set for the products of the
joint venture, and for the. products used by the joint venture
(materials, energy, etc)? How are assets to be valued? How
are conversion ratios to be set for measuring ruble and dollar
expenditures and receipts? .*
Turning first to the legal questions, we' can dispose of one
'important dimension quite readily. Soviet legal restrictions on
private ownership of means: of production, and the consequent
absence of any possibility of equity participation in the Western
sense, are not a substantial obstacle, since there are no legal
16. For a detailed treatment of the administration of the Soviet economy, see
A. NoVE, THE SOVIET ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTION 27-150' (2d rev. 'ed; 1969).
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restrictions on the power of Soviet foreign trade organizations
to contract with foreign firms. In other words, a Soviet foreign
trade organization may theoretically incur any contractual obli-
gation toward a foreign firm that it wishes to incur, and may
thus give the foreign firm by contract everything that the foreign
firm normally seeks to acquire by ownership.7
It is important to note, in this connection, that the Soviet
Foreign Trade Monopoly gives the central leadership a much
greater leeway in the field of foreign trade than in domestic
transactions. Foreign trade arrangements are treated quite dif-
ferently from domestic arrangements. Foreign trade is subject
to special foreign trade legislation and is only residually subject
to domestic law.
The foreign firm may feel somewhat naked, at first, with
only contractual rights and no ownership rights. In fact, it is
much better off. A contractual obligation, for example, backed
by a bank guarantee, to repatriate profits and, if necessary, capital,
in convertible currency,' would give more security than the most
absolute form of ownership, which may be only as good, in the
last analysis, as a court proceeding can make it. Moreover, by
such guarantee-backed contractual provisions the foreign firm
may, by agreement, be protected against taxes or any other
obligations. Finally, even managerial control can be preserved
in this way. For example, it could conceivably be provided by
contract that if the managerial advice given by the Western
partner were not followed, the Western partner could withdraw
and would be paid a certain sum as liquidated damages (or in
Soviet parlance, penalty).
The fact that such guarantees can be provided by contract
does not, of course, mean that they will be. At a meeting in
Tbilisi in April 1974 at which a group of prominent Americans
met for four days with a group of prominent Soviet citizens to
discuss ways of promoting peaceful relations between their two
countries - the eighth of the. so-called "Dartmouth" con-
17. A consideration of contract as a medium for investment in socialist countries
may be found in W. Friedmann,-The Contractual Joint Venture, 10 COL. J. WORLD
Bus: 57 (1972) and in MCMILLAN & ST. CHARLES, supra note 9 passim. Pederson
has analyzed the legitimacy under Soviet law of the use of contracts by FTOs to
accomplish the ends of foreign ownership, supra note 3, at 410-11.
18. The various guarantee possibilities, including domestic guarantees by the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation-for U.S. investors, are explored in Pederson,
supra note 3, at 413-14.
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ferences - one of the sessions was devoted to a discussion of the
possibility of establishing joint ventures, and the Soviet partici-
pants, while agreeing that the problem should be studied further,
stressed that institutional differences between the two countries
must be taken into account and, in particular, that "Soviet
constitutional regulations and traditions must not be infringed."
Soviet constitutional regulations and traditions would not
only preserve the abstract right of state ownership of land and
means of production but would also prevent any appearance of
capitalist exploitation or imperialism. Some Americans have pro-
posed to avoid the ownership question by means of long-term
leases, but this may be ideologically unacceptable, if only because
Karl Marx wrote that the bourgeoisie often disguises its ex-
ploitative property rights in the form of security devices in which
ownership is retained by the creditor while use is transferred to
the debtor.19 On the other hand, rather broad rights of possession
and use, and limited rights of disposition, are already separated
by Soviet doctrine from abstract ownership: they can be exercised
by enterprises themselves as part of "operative management. '2 0
Still, Soviet "constitutional regulations and traditions" would
almost certainly impose severe limitations upon the rights of a
joint venture to dispose of assets and upon its rights of manage-
ment generally. Here the joint venture encounters the range of
problems that are more economic than legal, although they have
an important legal dimension.
In order to determine what the Soviets might permit to
be done in a joint venture by contract, it may be useful to
examine what Romania and Hungary, in 1971 and 1972 respec-
tively, have authorized by legislation.21 The Romanian law22
19. Marx referred specifically to purchases by consumers with payments in
installments, the seller retaining the right of repossession in case of default. In fact,
Soviet FTOs have leased foreign ships, trucks, construction materials, and, very
likely, other kinds of property. [Author's footnote.]
20. See Berman, JUSTICE IN THE USSR 114-17 (rev. ed. 1963).
21. For general discussion of the Romanian and Hungarian experience, see
Burgess, Direct Foreign Investment in Eastern Europe: Problems and Perspectives
of Romania's Joint Venture Legislation, 6 LAW & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 1059 (1974);
Note, The Legal Framework for American Direct Investment in Eastern Europe:
Romania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, 7 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 187; see generally EAST-
WEST Bus. TRANSACTIONS, supra note 4; Pederson, supra note 3, at 397-406.
22. Law No. 1 of March 17, 1971, Official Bulletin of the Socialist Republic of
Romania (hereinafter Official Bulletin), trans. in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 161 (1972) ;
implemented in Decrees No. 424 and 425, Nov. 2, 1972, Official Bulletin No. 121,
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is of special interest because one joint venture between a United
States firm and a Romanian economic organization, called Rom
Control Data, or Romcontrol, has been established under it. Rom-
control is a joint venture, in Bucharest, between the Minnesota
computer manufacturer Control Data Corporation and the
Romanian Industrial Group for Electronics and Vacuum Tech-
nique.23 The 1971 Romanian statute under which it was organized
provides that the operation of "mixed companies," as they are
called, shall not be governed by the central economic plan, that
they may sell and buy abroad directly, and that all accounts
except wages and salaries shall be in hard currency. In other
words, what is contemplated is that the mixed companies shall
operate in what has been called a "foreign currency enclave, 24
and as much as possible shall avoid involvement in the domestic
Romanian economy. The statute authorizes joint management,
including a veto power for each party, and the distribution of
profits in proportion to capital contribution. However, the foreign
investor may generally not have more than 49 percent of the total
capitalization and in any case may never possess effective majority
control.25
The restriction of the joint venture to a foreign currency
enclave helps to resolve some of the most critical questions of
pricing. Presumably, even goods sold by the joint venture to
domestic buyers should be sold at export prices minus transporta-
tion and insurance charges.26 Nevertheless, to the extent that the
joint venture procures materials, energy, fuel, and the like, from
the domestic socialist economy and to the extent that it sells its
products within that economy, it cannot help but be deeply
involved in the network of what the Soviets call "material-
Nov. 4, 1972, trans. in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 651 (1973). For an analysis of the
provisions of Hungarian, Romanian, and other East European joint venture legislation
see Gordon, The Developing Law of Joint Ventures in Eastern Europe, 9 TEx. INT'L
L.J. 281, 303 (1974).
23. For a description of the Rom Control venture, see Donaghue, Control Data's
Joint Venture in Romania, 8 COL. J. WORLD. Bus. 83 (1973).
24. For a discussion of the different methods which are used by socialist
countries to overcome the currency problem, including the "enclave" system, see
Pederson, supra, note 3, at 401-06.
25. Law No. 1, supra note 23, art. 59.
26. A discussion of pricing and related problems may be found in Berman and
Bustin, supra note 1, at 55-58; Pederson, supra note 3, at 424-30.
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technical supply," and therefore it cannot help but be deeply
involved in the central economic plan. In the Soviet context,
therefore, I believe that the entire operation of a joint venture,
down to the last details, should, if it is to succeed, be cleared in
advance with at least a dozen different Soviet bureaucracies,
starting with Gosplan and ending with the local soviet, and the
clearing in advance would have to take place at least annually
throughout the life of the enterprise. The original contract would
have to include pre-arranged long-term renewable contracts with
Soviet domestic producing and marketing enterprises and units as
well as with Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations.
Additionally, the American partner to a joint venture in the
Soviet Union may want to provide by contract for freedom from
a number of aspects of the planned economy. A few of the things
the American partner to a joint venture in the Soviet Union
would want to contract out of include: directive planning, un-
limited inspections, freedom from changes in plans or orders with-
out prior consultation, absolute dependence on Soviet sources of
supply, turnover taxes, and success indicators other than profits. 27
It is impossible to know how these fascinating and frustrating
complexities should be resolved until they are converted from
hypothetical speculations to actual experience. If the past is a
reliable guide, they are apt to prove less troublesome in practice
than in theory.
We return, in conclusion, to the contrast between joint ven-
tures and industrial cooperation agreements as they are now
structured. Although obviously a high degree of cooperation is
required to make industrial cooperation agreements work, these
agreements do not, as yet, deeply involve the non-Soviet party
in the internal legal and institutional structure of the Soviet
economy. Relationships are often commenced by agreement with
the State Committee for Science and Technology, a committee
of the USSR Council of Ministers charged with coordinating all
scientific and technological research in the Soviet Union. Once
the State Committee is satisfied, the Western firm then makes a
contract with one of the Foreign Trade Organizations that carry
on the actual export and import operations. For example, the
Western firm would contract with Litsenzintorg if technology is
to be transferred, or with one of the machinery importing Foreign




Trade Organizations (e.g., Mashine Import, Stankoimport, Prom-
mashimport) if plant and equipment are to be transferred, and
so on.2 8 The Foreign Trade Organization's domestic customer -
usually the economic ministry charged with responsibility for
providing the particular type of product or service within the
Soviet Union - may be brought into the discussions with the
non-Soviet party at some stage of the contract negotiations; in
addition, there will usually be relations with the ministry, and
with particular state enterprises under the ministry, when super-
vision of installation of plant and equipment is required or when
after-sales services are involved. However, a main feature of the
arrangement is the high degree of centralization of decision-
making on the Soviet side and the great distance that is main-
tained between the non-Soviet party and the ultimate Soviet users
of his product. Only the Foreign Trade Organization is empowered
to enter into a foreign trade transaction; the economic ministry
and its enterprises, which have control of the technical side of
the transaction, must remain in the background of the actual
negotiations. Even the State Committee on Science and Tech-
nology is not empowered, under Soviet law, to enter into foreign
trade transactions. The non-Soviet party may seek guarantees
from the Soviet contract-partner that its domestic customers will
act in certain ways, but he himself is not directly involved in
their operations. He is asked to take the internal operations of
the Soviet economy as a given.
The exclusion of foreign interference was, of course, one of the
fundamental purposes of the Soviet Foreign Trade Monopoly,
established by Lenin in April 1918,29 before the introduction of
the program of War Communism: all exports and imports were
concentrated in the hands of a few central state agencies in order
to protect the Soviet economy against foreign penetration. There
was no desire to eliminate foreign trade but only to conduct it
in such a way as to, first, reduce Soviet dependence on foreign
capital and foreign goods and, second, advance Soviet economic
development (principally by the importation of producer goods
and technology). These two aims were among the basic objectives
28. For a complete list of FTOs and their functions (export, import, technical
assistance and special services) see Berman and Bustin, supra note 1, at 30 n.24.
29. Sobranie Uzakonenii RSFSR No. 33, item 432, translated in Quigley,
The Soviet Foreign Trade Monopoly 202-04 (1974).
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of the Revolution, and they remain essential parts of Soviet
foreign economic policy.
Nevertheless, despite ideology, history has worked a substan-
tial transformation in the nature of Soviet foreign economic re-
lations. In the past 30 years, the Soviet economy has become an
integral part of the world economy. This is more than a hope;
it is a reality. The hope is that the reality will be increasingly
recognized and more fully understood both by the Soviet Union
and by its trading partners.
It was World War II which brought the Soviet Union back
into the world economy. In the immediate post-war period, to
be sure, Soviet economic ties with the United States, Western
Europe, and Japan were broken by the Cold War. But by the
same token, Soviet economic ties with Eastern Europe were
greatly strengthened. From a short-range point of view, this
could be viewed as Soviet economic domination over her "satel-
lites." In a larger historical perspective, it was the creation of
an interdependence between the Soviet economy and the econo-
mies of the Eastern European countries, which in turn retained
some of their economic interdependence with the West. In time,
all the socialist countries have become increasingly involved
economically not only with each other but with virtually all other
countries of the world.
As a result, Soviet economists and jurists, writing about the
purposes of the Soviet Foreign Trade Monopoly, and about foreign
trade planning generally, have added to the two original primary
purposes - economic independence and industrialization - a
third, namely, the promotion of the international division of labor.
This refers in the first instance to trade with the other CMEA
countries, but it also refers more broadly to trade with non-
socialist countries.
The Eastern European countries are now leading the way in
the development of new forms of international economic co-
operation among themselves as well as with the West. A few
joint enterprises - sovmestnye predpriiatiia - have been estab-
lished with the CMEA. Romania and Hungary have enacted
laws that have paved the way for joint ventures with Western
firms. The Soviet leadership is being very cautious, but it is
unquestionably beginning to be seriously interested in joint
ventures, especially with large U.S. firms. The degree of caution
is itself a sign of the very great potential economic and political
significance of such an intermarriage between Soviet state eco-
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nomic organizations and American private corporations. I have
in mind two obvious main points of significance: economically,
once market-oriented Western managers start to operate within
the Soviet planned economy, they may contribute to a decentral-
ization of Soviet economic administration and a rationalization
of the price structure; and politically, once mergers begin be-
tween Soviet and American organizations, the net of economic
involvement may become so complex and strong that it will be
able to contain political conflicts.
